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The paper presents the evolution of monetary regimes and monetary reforms in the Soviet 
Union during the period following the seizure of power in October 1917 until the currency 
reforms carried out by the Soviet authorities in mid-1924. The studied period gives possibilities 
for reflection on the “diversity and complexity of monetary practices”, the currency competition 
and complementarity, the various ways of connecting the different monetary functions 
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I 
Introduction  
 
This paper presents the evolution of monetary regimes and monetary reforms in the Soviet 
Union during the period following the seizure of power in October 1917 until the currency 
reforms carried out by the Soviet authorities in mid-1924. We are interested in exploring the 
period for a number of reasons. 
 
First, the examined period gives possibilities for reading from the viewpoint of “diversity and 
complexity of monetary practices”, of competition and complementarity of money, of the 
various ways of connecting the different monetary functions (measure, exchange, payment, 
store of value etc.). Of special interest are the relations between measure (accounting) and 
exchange (payment), and between large and small token money.  
 
Second, especially interesting is the experience of parallel circulation of two main media of 
exchange (from July 1922 to May 1924) where phases of complementarity alternated with 
phases of competition2. The period of War communism and natural economy offers a number 
of proposals and projects were advanced for exchange in kind and reducing money to a tool of 
calculation, and later, for eliminating money as measure, unit of account. Over the examined 
period, there were episodes of mass dissemination of numerous spontaneously emerging forms 
of currency (often referred to as “money substitutes”).  
 
Third, and more generally, the early Soviet experience provides food for thought about the 
debates between the two major schools of monetary theory and practice: (i) that of exogenous, 
or commodity money having a positive intrinsic value and (ii) endogenous money, or fiat 
money, either fiscal or bank. Of special interest is the interaction between fiscal and bank 
money.  
 
Fourth, the experience is interesting from the standpoint of the fundamental debate on the 
existence of a specific tradition, archetype, in the monetary practices and thinking in Russia 
(and perhaps in Asia) where, unlike the western tradition, money is associated with the 
centralised power and are ideal by nature. The discussion about the specific Russian order 
clearly fits into the much larger debate about Russia’s path of civilisation (slavophilism versus 
prowesternism), etc. Theoretical discussions from the NEP period in many respects repeat 
theoretical and policy debates during the 1895/1998 monetary reform (brought to completion 
by Count Sergei Witte)3. One of the leading and most original participants in these discussions, 
Sergey Sharapov (1856-1911) put forward numerous proposals of a model of “absolute, ideal 
money”. In his model the medium of exchange and payments function is inferior, secondary 
and subordinate to measurement, accounting, which in turn is ideal and a function of absolute 
power and trust of the Russian people with the monarch (see also Pososhkov, 1987 [1724] 375-
377).  
 
Hence, fifth, interesting are the theoretical discussions and projects of monetary systems, where 
we find intermingled not only the interests of different social groups and actors, but also the 
                                                 
2 In one of my previous studies, I overestimated the role of competition between the various types of money and 
underestimated the points of their complementarity (Nenovsky, 2006). 
3 See Vlassenko (1949). 
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various ideas on money and economy in general4. In this array of thoughts, the Bolsheviks’ 
monetary stabilisation efforts were the product of a special synthesis of the ideas and projects 
of post-war monetary stabilisation in the others countries with the specific problems and tasks 
of the Soviet regime (war, monetary revenue was the only source of financing of the huge 
budget deficit soaring to 60-90%), as well with some not quite clarified theoretical premises 
about the place of money in the new communist society.  
 
Finally, sixth, we should not forget that the NEP experience in the monetary area was used in a 
number of events as an example of monetary stabilisation. These cases included the German 
stabilisation which followed right after the Soviet one (organised by Schacht in 1923), Greek 
reform in1944/1945, and in modern times the stabilisation of the Yugoslavian dinar (initiated 
by D. Avramovich in 1993/1995). The NEP parallel currencies reform was prised highly by J. 
M. Keynes (in his Tract of Monetary Reform).  
 
At the beginning below, I propose a tentative historical chronology of the evolution of monetary 
regimes in Soviet Russia from October 1917 until the complete withdrawal of the sovznaks (or 
sovznaki – transliterated from Russian plural form of sovznak) from circulation in May 1924. 
Within each period, I have given the basic facts, practical measures, and theoretical discussions 
in relation to money. Generally, and with some provisos, I have distinguished five periods. 
 
Period I: An attempt to build state capitalism (October 1917 to June/mid 1918) which is actually 
the period from the October revolution through to War communism.   
 
Period II: War economy (natural, non-monetary subsistence) based on distribution of goods.  
Issuing economy (Emissionnoe hoziaistvo)5 (June/mid 1918 to February/March 1920) which is 
the period of Civil War and War Communism. 
 
Period III: Socialist non-monetary commodity exchange (simple socialist commodity economy) 
(February/March 1920 to March/August 1921) till the launching the NEP.  
 
Period IV: NEP until the issuance of chervonetz. Here we speak of ‘inflationary economy” 
(March/August 1921 to November 1922). 
 
Period V: NEP and dual currency circulation (November 1922 to May 1924), with two phases 
money complementarity (November 1922 – May 1923) and money competition (May 1923 – 
May 1924) 
 
This last period covers the time form the effective issuance of the chervonetz (gold backed 
currency) their circulation in parallel with the old sovznaks (unbacked paper currency), through 
to the final point of the currency reform when the entire circulation was unified based on gold. 
Within this period, two phases can be distinguished. During the first phase, also called “a period 
of peaceful co-existence”, the spheres of chervonetz and sovznak were centrally managed, while 
the second, which started in mid (to be more particular in May) 1923, was characterised by 
competition and fight between the two types of currency with the chervonetz becoming winner. 
In a whole we obtain a following picture (see Figure 1) 
 
 
                                                 
4 See the one-of-a-kind in terms of depth and based on reading of the archival materials of that period study by 
Goland, 2006. 
5 That mean the principal source of government is money issue, economy based on seigniorage.  
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Figure 1 Periodisation of Soviet monetary reforms (1917 – 1924) 
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Let us look into the details of these five periods.  
 
 
 
II 
Attempt to build state capitalism (first period: October 1917 to June/mid 1918). 
 
This was in effect the period from the October revolution to War communism. Here the main 
theoretical and guiding sources was Lenin’s book “Left Wing Childishness and the Petty 
Bourgeois Mentality” (18 April 1917) where state capitalism is implied, i.e., temporary using 
the state machine for social production purposes. According to Lenin, “State capitalism would 
be a step forward as compared with the present state of affairs in our Soviet Republic”. 
 
After the revolution, the issues of currency and budget stabilisation, etc., were discussed, as 
well as the option of suspending money printing done during the war and during Kerensky’s 
provisional government. Nevertheless, the strong depreciation continued (the rouble fell down 
to 32 kopeks in 1917) with the deficit reaching colossal proportions (81.7% in 1917 and 66.9% 
in 1918). 
 
Lenin fought against left-wing (“petty-bourgeois”) communists who were in favour of a 
monetary system based only on centralised social accounting (O. Schmidt and *). Rosentuk 
proposed “work tickets”, “receipts”, state shops bonds, etc.). Left-wing economists proposed 
that the currency should be abolished, whereas Lenin upheld that this should only be done as a 
coercive measure. In 1918, in Turkestan, an article titled “Down with money! (Doloi dengi!)” 
was published and a project of moving to coupons. 
 
At that point, the decentralisation of monetary practices took place, and there were a great 
number of monetary experiments and projects. Thus, for instance, cooperatives and private 
banking consortiums, to name a few, issued currency. For example, Moscow’s industrialists 
union proposed that regional bonds should be issued in circulation along with the state currency 
(Narodnoe hozyaistvo (Народное хозяство), 1918, 6/7) 
 
Until mid-1918, commodity exchange was a voluntary, albeit oftentimes broken principle. That 
is, Lenin tried to build a centralised system of commodity exchange at fixed prices (rationed 
products). The experience proved that the voluntariness of that exchange collapsed and evolved 
into a commodity-money turnover, into exchange, when fixed prices gradually becoming 
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flexible. This happened because a voluntary exchange at fixed prices leads to non-equivalent 
exchange and shortage of goods.  
 
Things changed as the Civil war broke out with the counter-revolutionary mutiny of Socialist 
revolutionaries in Yaroslav in June 1918. In fact they took Yaroslav branch of Gosbank under 
their control and took the banknotes (the cash).  
 
II 
Non-monetary and distribution-based economy (June 1918 to February/March 1920). 
 
This was the period of War communism, and the so-called “issuing economy (emisionnoe 
hoziaistvo)”. The war led to building a military economy intended to organise the army’s food 
supplies provision, which was financed by means of taking away resources from the peasants. 
In late 1918, a state monopoly of trade was introduced and a centralised distribution of products 
in the public, nationalised, sector, followed by massive inflation. Monetary income, seigniorage 
(emmissia) was the only source of incomes as there were no taxes, no possibility for issuing 
debt, and no gold reserves (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Annual growth of the monetary supply, prices and seigniorage (calculated by E. 
Preobrazhenski), 1914 – 1922, logarithmic scale 
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At this moment centrifugal forces were unleashed in the former Russian empire as a large 
number of attempts were made to issue local currency reaching up to 200 according to Atlas 
(2181 according to Chuchin and 6000 according to            ), (Atlas/112, Chuchin, 1927, 
Yurovsky, 2008 [1917-1927], 213)(see Figure 3)6. Thus, there were some 60 types issued by 
local authorities, and also those issued by restaurants and cafes. For example, the circus in Tuais 
issued its own circulation bonds (called script). In some regions in Chechnya (Grozny) religious 
money were issued, in Turkestan – turkbonds, and so one. Currency were also issued in the Far 
East (printed by private firms or in Japan), also in Ukraine (printed in Germany), and by the 
various White Guard groups (Denikin, Kolchak, Semenov, Czech Legion), etc. 
 
 
Figure 3 Typology of Currency issues (extended chart from Atlas, )  
 
Total Currency Issues 
Currency Issues  
Soviet territory
Currency Issues 
non-Soviet territory 
Former Russian Empire
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
a3
a1 a2 a4 a5 a6 a7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
b3 b3
 
A1 - Centralised currency issue of RSFSR 
a1 – Former currencies (tsarist and provisional government issues) 
a2 – Soviet currency issue 1919, “units of accounts roubles (razschenie znaki)”  
a3 – Soviet currency issued by local soviet authorities with the sanction of Central 
Government/ex: Arahangelsk Gosbank issue 1918/25 roubles (morjovki). 
A2 – Currency issues of others Soviets republics  
a4 – Currencies issued by sovereign soviet republics (Kavkaz union/Azaerbadjan, 
Gergie, Armenie/Buhara 
A3 – Others soviet currency issues  
a5 – Local soviet issues without sanction  
a6 – Issues by cooperatives, others social organizations 
a7 – Issued by private entities  
 
B1 – Currency issues of capitalist states, formerly part of Russian Empire  
b1 – Official currency issues of Poland, Baltic countries  
                                                 
6 Details on different currency issues could be found in Pogrebtsky (1924), Rinkov (2006), Petin (2011), Orlov 
(2012).  
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B2 – Currency issues during Civil War and Allied Intervention  
b2 – Currency issued by governments of Denikin, Vrangel, Koltchak7 
b3 – Currency Issues by Intervention Allied Powers (foreign currency covered, or local 
issues non-covered)  
B3 – Currency issued my local authorities, city authorities, cooperatives, private and others  
b4 – Issues by municipalities, towns etc 
b5 – Issues by cooperatives, others social organizations… 
b6 – Issued by private entities  
b7 – Issued by private army (Czech legion)  
 
 
Having done an analysis on local currencies in 1919, the Russian Treasury (Narcomfin) 
announced its official position: 
 
“Concerning local currency issuance, the centre is oftentimes in a difficult situation. On 
the one hand, the principle of nationwide currency system has it that no separatist 
currency issuing be allowed; and on the other, the centre’s financial problems and its 
detachment from the outlying districts compels a temporary retreat from this principle.  
At the first chance, however, to the extent the fiscal and technical aspects would permit, 
the centre seeks to achieve unification of the monetary system at the national level” 
(“Our currency circulation”, 1926, 257 and Atlas (1969), 114) 
 
 
The authorities took actions to centralise and unify the monetary economy. Turkbonds for 
instance were exchanged at the rate of 10 turkbonds to 1 rouble. We should note that the Soviet 
government issued in 1917/1919 mainly currency notes of the old specimens (tsarist and of the 
Provisional government), in 1918 state credit notes (called “creditki”), and in 1919 – currency 
of the RSFSR. On first of January 1920, sovznaks accounted for 56.2% of the total supply and 
on first of January 1921 the old pre-soviet currency notes were just 8.9%. As a whole, there 
were several types of currency with fluctuating rates between them (see table 1). Although the 
media of exchange were diverse, yet all were based on the gold unit of account, the gold pre-
war rouble.  
 
 
Table 1. Structure of the money supply on 01/04/1920 
Kinds of Currency Notes Volume % of money supply 
Tsartski  21 796 6.4 
Dumski 40 358 11.9 
Kerenki 46 768 13.8 
Soviet emissions/sovznaks 230 777 67.9 
          Piatakovski 221 282  
          Exchange certificates 9 495  
Total 339 697 100 
Source: Apostol (1921), 883 
 
                                                 
7 Anarchical organization of Nestor Mahno for instance issued currency/bon named “liberty” (Vorosii istorii, 
1966, 9, 49), but this fact is actually challenged (see Numbon, 1996, 6 (36): 1-8).  
8 
 
The state of economic thinking of the moment could be illustrated by quote from Trotsky’s 
speech at the Second congress of the Communist International on July the 23rd, 1919 
regarding the issuance of paper money after the war:  
 
The issuance of paper money continues to escalate with a growing speed. While in 
Soviet Russia the growing amount of paper currency and their devaluation together 
with the development of the public economy, the planed redistribution of products 
and the growing naturalization of the wages emerges only as a result of the decline 
of “commodity and money relations” in the capitalist countries the growing amount 
of paper money is a sign of the deepening economic chaos and inevitable collapse”, 
Trotsky, 2005 [1920], 479. 
 
Soon after the problem of currency hunger emerged as the currency supply depreciated in real 
terms due to the high inflation. An evidence of the increased money printing was the higher 
number of workers in the printing works to 13 616 in 1921 (11 260 in 1920, 7 500 in 1917, and 
4 500 before the war). Overall, the entire period of War communism was characterised by 
currency and especially small denominations shortage. Real value declined rapidly (table 2).  
 
Table 2 Real value of currency in circulation 
(Based on the all-Union price index) 
 
 1918 1919 1920 1921 
In million 
roubles  
1214 348 88 65 
In % of 1918  100 28 7 5 
Source: Atlas (1969), 130 
 
According to Zahari Atlas: 
 
“The severity and chronic currency hunger and the tremendous efforts to handle it 
evidence that despite the widespread view, currency, despite their diminished scope of 
circulation, play an important role even in a situation of military communist economy: 
the currency problem stood very sharply and both the local and central bodies of the 
Soviet authority gave it constant attention.” (Atlas (1969), 129) 
 
Moreover, while resources were mobilised from the peasantry and from the remaining private 
sector by issuing currency (sovznaks), a process of naturalisation developed in the public and 
nationalised sectors involving non-monetary (in-kind) distribution. Was introduced a “surplus 
appropriation system” (food rationing at fixed prices), which was a result of subjective factors 
and communist ideology (“economy without money”). At the end of April 1920 a work ration 
in kind and in-kind methods of payment and distribution were introduced (work was classified 
into four categories). According to Lenin, the system was called by the war situation as a tool 
for measuring different kinds of work. However internal contradictions quickly appeared. 
Labour productivity fell sharply. 
 
“Its development pushes money outside the sphere of distribution of commodities while 
posing the issue of monetary assessment of in-kind bonus payment, i.e. proving that 
money is indispensable in implementing the socialist principles of division of labour”. 
(Atlas (1969), ***) 
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In other words, after the Bolsheviks clearly demonstrated that they would do away with money 
as a medium of exchange, a new problem emerged – the need for money as measure, as a unit 
of account. That gave rise to various theories and proposals of non-monetary exchange and non-
monetary measurement as a response to the question of how measurement should be done 
within a socialist setting8. The policy proposals were numerous and are summarised in Table 
3).  
 
Table 3 Competing theories of organising non-monetary socialist economy 
 
A. Weinstein  
А. Chayanov         
O. Neurath  
M. Smith  
S. Klepikov  
S. Strumilin  
(subsequently he worked at Gosplan) 
Non-value and non-
monetary exchange  
Non-value 
measurement  
(No single measure) 
 
Value measurement 
based on energy 
(human and machine, 
heat) 
Value measurement based on labour 
(measurement in units of labour, socially 
necessary labour costs) 
 
Imitation of monetary economy, this is a 
mathematical problem. 
Social utility (not individual utility, Jevons). 
 
Efficiency factors 
  
Efficiency 
coefficients (of 
enterprises and 
branches…), 
correlation between 
efforts and outcomes 
compared to average 
ratio … 
(similar to modern 
DEA method) 
 
Chayanov (1921) 
Exchange in kind, 
subsistence farming. 
The “saving of force, 
power (ekonomia 
sili)” principle (law). 
 
 
Allocating 
consumption  
(connected 
consumption/ 
 
Unit of measurement  
“Work energy unit”, 
“Ened” energy unit 
(energeticheskaya 
edinitsa) =  human 
energy (live labour) 
+ machine energy  
(“dead” labour). 
 
In other words, 
taking into account 
labour costs 
including their 
technical capabilities 
(the debate is about 
whether to take into 
account only labour 
or labour and capital, 
i.e., whether the 
interest rate should 
be included in the 
prices). 
The depreciation 
(amortisation) issue. 
 
It is believed that the “no money” option 
does not exclude value measurement which 
is necessary in a planned system (but a 
“new form of value”) 
 
Labour value unit (“Tred” = trudovaya 
edinitsa) = “the value of the product of 
labour per a normal working day of a first 
wage category worker at 100% performance 
of his work norm” (NN: The issue of simple 
labour!) 
 
1 kilo Tred = 1000 Tred  
 
According to Strumilin, a dual system is 
needed, between different sectors: 
(i) Inside the public sector measurement in 
work (“treds”, working hours), the medium 
of exchange are the sovznaks (these after all 
are not money …) 
(ii) Measurement between sectors (public, 
private and external) is in gold (in gold 
rouble), while the medium of exchange is 
money and that is the “work bond (tred”).  
 
                                                 
8 The idea of a material, in-kind balance sheet and budget, “prices without money” or “money without monetary 
system”. A Utilization committee was set up; in 19/1/1920 the central bank was abolished. All was distributed in 
tickets and cards, rations, the idea of in-kind measurement and establishment: in-kind, material bank 
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Rationing (payek). 
 
 
 
The two measurement units (gold and tred) 
should be linked by fixing an exchange rate. 
(iii) and later on, in the public sector – a 
“monetary system with parallel circulation 
of two currencies: 1) commodity backed 
(treds and work-roubles) and 2) unbacked 
(sovznaks). 
 
 
 
Initially (in his letter form 19 of May 1919), Lenin supported the “no money” ideas. Even the 
word “money” was removed, the notion was termed “units of settlement/unit of account 
(razschetnii znak)”. Thus, from 4 of February 1919 “units of settlement of the RSFSR” were 
issued (some with inscription in seven languages), see Picture 1 and 2. 
 
Picture 1 Unit of Account of 500 roubles of the FRFSR issued in 1919  
 
 
 
Picture 2 Unit of Account of the FRFSR 500 roubles, inscription in different languages  
 
11 
 
 
 
 
In order to do away with money, the left communists (L. Trotsky, Y. Larin, E. Preobrazhenski) 
wanted to issue enormous quantity of money. Lenin, too, defended inflation. He believed that 
paper money served only to “borrow from peasants” (and not to expropriated from them) by 
the proletariat. It was considered as loan first for waging the war, and second for recovering the 
economy. Lenin, however, came to the awareness that village and town people should be on 
better terms and therefore suggested that the surplus appropriation system (food rationing) 
should shift to “a socialist commodity exchange”. It was supposed to be exchange without 
money. In Lenin’s own words, this was a needed “retreat”. Thus, a transition was made to the 
next stage of the evolution of the Bolshevik monetary system.  
 
 
III  
Socialist commodity (non-monetary) exchange (February/March 1920 to March/August 
1921) 
 
This was the third period until the beginning of NEP. As already mentioned, due to the inflation 
and the different purchasing power across the geographic regions, the so-called pack peddlers 
(meshochniki)9 came into existence, i.e., traders travelling from place to place and selling goods, 
etc., speculating from the difference in prices. There were no small denominations while high 
denominations were already in demand (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Value of the highest currency denomination, 1914 – 1921 
 
Value as of 1 January Currency denomination  
in rouble 
(Nominal) 
Real value of currency denomination  
 In rouble, calculated via the  
all-Union price index 
1914 500 495.05 
1915 500 384.61 
1916 500 349.65 
1917 500 170.06 
                                                 
9 In French homes à sac. 
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1918 1 000 48.17 
1919 1 000 6.09 
1920 10 000 4.13 
1921 10 000 0.59 
 
Media of exchange sprang spontaneously and sporadically into existence, mostly presented by 
foreign currencies, gold, and some sort of commodity money. Again according to Z. Atlas: 
 
“A study of the market relations in that period indicates that the market, along with 
abandoning the sovznaks, tried to create commodities-money outside the control and 
regulation of the state” (Atlas (1969), 165). 
 
Interestingly, during the period from the end of the war February/March 1920 until Kronshtadt 
Naval Rebellion (March 1921), Lenin considered the idea of experimenting through diverse 
local and regional experiences to select the most appropriate monetary and exchange system. 
Lenin set tasks in a following (“Hayekian”) way: 
 
“Practice is a criterion for efficient and equitable institution. In a few months we need 
to have practical results in order to compare and study them” (Atlas/171) 
 
In August/September 1921 occurred a natural spontaneous transition from commodity 
exchange to normal trade, i.e. buying and selling for money. Demand for money for transaction 
purposes emerged, especially at the end of the War communism. Mainly it was function of the 
expansion of commodity exchange, of the re-establishing of trade connections between the 
village and the town (so called “linkage” (smichka)). In August 1921, Lenin observed that 
money appeared on its own and he made a “new retreat” to monetary economy: According to 
him:  
 
“It appeared – and now you all know too well from practice, as is also obvious from the 
media – that commodity exchange has failed, failed in the sense that it turned into buy 
and sell. And now, we have to realise, if we don’t want to hide head under wing, if we 
don’t want to pretend we don’t see our defeat, if we don’t want to look in the face of 
danger.  
 
We need to realise that the retreat proved to be insufficient and so a further retreat is 
needed, yet another move back whereby from state capitalism we move to building state 
regulation of buy and sell and of currency circulation. Commodity exchange proved 
wrong, the private market proved stronger than us and instead of commodity exchange 
we experienced a simple buy and sell, i.e., trade.” (Lenin speech, VII Moscow Party 
Conference, Lenin, vol. 44, 207-208) 
 
Precisely because was searched village and town to have better relations (linkage/smichka) by 
developing trade between them. And whilst initially trade and currency circulation were viewed 
on par with direct commodity exchange, with in-kind payment, i.е., as an auxiliary form, later 
on they became leading.  That exactly was the decision to go for the NEP, the partial restitutions 
of capitalist and market economy principles. To note also that in this moment appeared one of 
the analysis concerning the impossibility for calculation without money under socialist 
economy, developed by Boris Brutzkus (1922), one of the forerunner of “socialist calculation 
debate” (see Brutzkus, edited by F. Hayek in 1937).  
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IV  
NEP until the monetary stabilisation (chervonets), NEP under inflationary economy 
(March/August 1921 to November 1922) 
 
This is the fourth period covers the time from the start of the NEP until the currency crisis in 
late 1922. Apart from the political and macroeconomic problems that led to a sharp change of 
the course in a direction to NEP (that are not object of analysis in this paper), the NEP launching 
was also for technical monetary reasons. The inflation of the official Soviet currency (sovznaks) 
and the appearance of various monetary substitutes (“local monetary issues”), notably the 
massive use of gold and foreign currency, had to be addressed urgently by means of monetary 
reform. The aim was to curb the unplanned monetisation of foreign and gold money, and 
prevent the seigniorage from being totally lost for the state.  
 
March 1921 put the beginning of the NEP (Х Congress) but it was not before August that 
monetary economy started to be talked about. Restoration occurred in the following order. 
Money was first restored as measurement, as a unit of account, then as a medium of payment 
and of exchange, firstly of high value denominations and secondly of small denominations.  
 
In 1920 according to Krestinsky’s calculations the budget deficit was around 98 %, 
Katzenellenbaum gives similar figures (see Table 5, 6) 
 
Table 5 Krestinsky’s figures 
 
 Revenue  
(millions roubles) 
Expenditure   
(millions roubles) 
Deficit  
(millions roubles) 
1918 1 804 46 726 44 922 
1919 48 954  216 697 167 743 
1920 150 000 1 150 000 1 000 000 
CBRP (1922), 11 
 
 
Table 6 Katzenellenbaum’s figures 
 
 In Millions of Roubles  Deficit % 
Of Total Expenditure   
Currency Issue  
Year  Revenue Expenditure Deficit    
1914 2 961 4 859 1 898 39.1 1 283 
1915 3 001 11 562 8 561 74.0 2 670 
1916 4 345 18 101 13 756 76.0 3 480 
1917 5 039 27 607 22 568 81.7 16 403 
1918 15 580 46 706 31 126 66.6 33 500 
1919 48 959 215 402 166 443 77.3 164 200 
1920 159 604 1.215 159 1 055 555 86.9 943 600 
1921 4 139 900 26 076 816 21 936 916 84.1 16 375 300 
Katzenellennbaum, 1924, 69 
 
In July 1921, the Politburo set the task of “deficit-free industry management”. Budget had to 
be balanced and reduced (XI Congress, December 1921). Austerity measures were taken, end 
of 1921, 60% of the state employees were made redundant, and further 25% were planned for 
1922 (CRBRP, 1922, 33). Was taken radical shift form food rationing to reintroducing 
14 
 
agriculture taxes first in kind and later in cash10. Seigniorage as main source of revenues was 
abandoned. According to Lenin “Our tactical objective is to stop issuing money”, it is “opium 
for the people” etc.  Following Volin’s analyses, seigniorage is paid up by no other but the state 
enterprises, i.е., it distributes income inside the public sector (“from one pocket to the other”) 
and does not generate new resources. There were intense debates how to begin reforms, from 
budget stabilisation to monetary stabilisation or vice versa. 
 
At that period started interesting academic debates about the efficiency of issuing money and 
seigniorage calculations, with participants L. Yurovsky, E. Preobrazhenskii, S. Strumilin, and 
L. Krestinsky, to name a few. All analyses and figures showed the insignificance of monetary 
revenue in real terms (gold roubles). (See Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10).  
 
 
Table 7 Krestinsky’s figures 
 
 Issues in nominal terms 
(paper roubles) 
Issue in real term (gold 
roubles)  
1919 168 milliards 300 millions 
1920 955 milliards 200 millions 
1921 10 000 milliards 200 millions 
CRBRP (1922, 12) 
 
 
Table 8 Preobrazhenskii’s calculations  
 
Year Issue in real term 
1914 1 397  
1915 (second half year) 2 068  
1916 1 768  
1917 (approximation) 2 500  
1918     525 
1919     386 
1920     186 
1921     145.8 
Pravda, 1922 
 
Table 9 Yurovsky’s figures 
Year  Value of the monetary issue  
in million of roubles/ 
Index of labor statistics  
1914 (second half year)    873.8 
1915 2 019.5 
1916 1 718.1 
1917 2 561.2 
1918    536.2 
1919    224.6 
1920    122.0 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that the surplus appropriation system (food rationing) led to a 6-fold lower income from 
taxes compared to the pre-war period (CRBRP, 1922, 10). 
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1921    149.0 
1922    296.5 
1923    327.8 
1924 (January and February)      33.9 
Total 8 863.6 
Yurovsky, 2008 (1927), 339 
 
Table 10 Yurovsky’s figures by periods  
Periods Number of 
Months  
Value of total issue in 
gold roubles  
Average per 
month  
War and till to February 1917 
Revolution   
32 4 862.5 151.9 
Provisional Government 8 1 735.6 216.9 
War Communism  44 1 492.0 33.9 
NEP 32 773.5 24.2 
Total  8 863.6 - 
 
The independent Gosbank was re-established in October/November 1921 although it continued 
to be under Narcomfin’s control and initially lent in sovznaks. One year later, Central Bank was 
granted the right to issue banknotes not to cover the deficit (only via short-term commodity 
loans). From that moment started the existence of two separated monetary circuits (soft fiscal 
and hard banking). The general purposes were to repair the budget, reduce lending through 
Gosbank (in particular in 1922), and improve the trade balance. In Lenin’s view, there were 
two tasks, first building Gosbank (in charge of commodity circulation, short-term loans etc.) 
and second, strengthening the budget by Narcomfin (reducing deficit, and introducing money 
taxes).  
 
The unit of account (“measure of value” in Marxist terms) was once again under debate. Budget 
had to be presented in “ideal” pre-war gold roubles (i.е., gold became a unit of account). The 
principal political text here was Lenin’s “On the significance of gold at the present stage and 
after the complete victory of socialism” (November 1921). Was introduced the gold 
measurement in pre-war gold roubles plus indexation to commodity rouble coefficient to count 
the change of price level during the wars years (Council of People’s Commissars, 5/11/1921)11, 
see (1).  
 
 
(1) P = P0 x к  
where  
Po – Price level in 1897 pre-war rouble 
k - Coefficient, set by Narcomfin, based on foodstuff basket 
 
Thus, two types of prices existed, gold and paper linked through a floating rate. At this point a 
debate was started which price, gold level (P0) should be taken as reference. Three option were 
discussed: (i) historically, price level from Tsarist Russia, 1898/1913, (ii) externally, current 
                                                 
11 According to many authors was provisional because this coefficient is determined by changes in the prices of a 
particular basic foodstuff basket.  
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level from the capitalist countries through the exchange rate, or (iii) price level of a particular 
commodity basket, commodity collateral (Е. Preobrazhenskii’s “inflation targeting” proposal).  
Prices gradually shifted from fixed into controlled, and subsequently to free-floating (here the 
main intellectual source came form Lenin’s letter to Tsyurupa, 18/2/1922) 
 
As a whole, we could summarise. Unit of account (“measure of value”) was gold rouble and 
gold. Medium of exchange and means of payment in the nationalised sector were sovznaks, 
which were paper fiat money. And as medium of exchange and means of payment in the private 
sector and among sectors were used gold and foreign currency. The means of saving was gold. 
 
A flight from sovznaks started, as it was pushed away by gold (the reason behind this was that 
the exchange rate between them was floating, and not fixed)12. The crisis in late 1922 was 
currency hunger. A new wave of local money and media of exchange appeared in great numbers 
(bonds, stamps, labels bearing the Narcomfin stamp). In 1922/1923, permission was issued for 
these to be used in local budgets (Pogrebetsky, 1924, Chuchin, 1927). At this moment new 
official media of payments and media of exchange came into being, - bonds issued in relation 
to the grain loan (reimbursement were made either in cash or in grain). Two grain loans and 
one sugar loan were floated. In 1922, the first Soviet rouble was issued and the term “unit of 
settlement rouble” ceased to be used. The new currency appeared named “Rouble monetary 
unit” began to be used instead (1 rouble 1922 = 10 000 paper sovznaks (after the denomination).  
 
The 1922/1923 budget was covered by a 26.6 % issue (whereas during the years 1918-1920 – 
from 66% to 85 %.). In that period, international monetary conferences were held, and of 
particular importance was this in Genoa (1922) where Russian delegation tried to negotiate new 
debts. Western creditors were reluctant because of Bolshevik’s refusal to recognise the Tsar’s 
debts. The NEP project and the idea of issuing parallels currencies, was supported by Keynes 
(in his Tract of Monetary Reform). But, according to a majority of economist form that period, 
Ozerov for instance, maintained that no stabilisation on Soviet ground was possible (The 
Economist and Report of Russian Banks’ Representatives in Paris, CRBRP, 1922)13. 
 
At that point started one of the most interesting and theoretically deep discussion of how to 
stabilise the Russian currency. Although projects were advanced before that, in June/July 1922 
a number of academic and policy sessions were held in an extremely free and constructive tone 
(Goland, 2006, CRBRP, 1922, Strumilin, ***, Dobrohodov, 2008). Once again, these projects 
reproduce astonishingly the monetary reforms of Witte’s 1895/1897 (on Witte’s reforms see 
Kaufman, , Sharapov, 1895, Guriev, 1903, Vlassenko, 1949, Van Laue, 1969). 
                                                 
12 Had it been fixed, Graham’s law would have been observed leading to exactly the opposite – pushing gold 
away.  
13 See also Spring Rice (1919), Arena (1923), Lyon (1927), Eiacheff (1931), Ciocca (1933), Griziotti 
Kretschmann (1924, 1928), Kokovtzeff (1931), Nolde (1928), Temkin (1965).  
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Table 11 Currency reform projects, for introduce a second medium of exchange  
 
Proposals from abroad Proposal form Russian 
scholars (Witte 
reformers) 
 
Central Bank 
(Gosbank) 
proposal 
 
Treasury (Narcomfin)  
proposal  
 
Planning 
Committee 
(Gosplan) proposal  
 
А. Putilov 
(Large industrialist and 
banker, Russian-Asian Bank) 
 
Foreign bank plus Soviet 
participation in its capital. 
Bank was to issue banknotes 
in Russia fixed to the French 
gold franc. Credibility comes 
from abroad and would lead to 
foreign loans. 
 
Supported by the Bolshevik L. 
Krasin (Foreign trade 
commissionaire) 
 
Project of 
Information/Temps 
(Paris)/1922 
 
Issuing Bank for Russia with 
branches in Russia issuing 
banknotes convertible to 
foreign currency at a fixed 
exchange rate. Banknotes 
V. Tarnovskii 
Powerful foreign financial 
group to set up a bank and 
issue a loan, of much 
higher capital than 
Putilov’s.  
 
Issue a parallel 
competitive medium of 
exchange (banknote). The 
banknote to replace the 
sovznak completely. 
 
N. Kutler  
(involved in Witte’s 
reform of 1897/1898, met 
with Keynes) 
 
Not as a competitive 
currency (as these could 
be contaminated) but as 
complementary, and by 
gradually withdrawing the 
Soviet currency issue 
from circulation.  
А. Scheimann 
Gosbank should 
issue banknotes 
based on short-
term obligations 
(of up to 2 years) 
and backed by and 
convertible into 
gold coin. 
 
In a debate with 
Sokolnikov 
(Narcomfin) 
insisted that 
Gosbank should 
issue small 
denominations of 
gold backed 
banknotes.  
 
However, the 
Narcomfin was 
reluctant as it 
feared it might lose 
the seigniorage 
G. Sokolnikov 
Bank bills (banknotes), backed by 
gold but nonconvertible, called 
hryvna (1 hrivna = 2 gold roubles). 
 
According to L. Yurovskii 
1 hrivna = 10 gold roubles  
 
Politburo (29 June 1922), with the 
purpose to prevent competition 
and so avoid a zero seigniorage. 
“Peaceful co-existence” was 
promoted (complementarity). 
 
The issue of small value 
denominations, and increase the 
value of the smallest 
denominations of hrivna (5, 10, 
25, 50, and 100). Banknotes to 
become means of saving. 
 
Politburo (20 July 1922) and 
Decree of 25 July 1922 to be 
issued by the name of chervonets  
 
S. Strumilin  
Levied critique 
against gold 
stabilisation 
(1/6/1922, in Pravda 
and 
Ekonomicheskaya 
Zhizn).  
 
He critiqued 
Sokolnikov and 
proposed 
stabilisation based 
on the commodity 
rouble, and not gold 
backed. Model 
inspired by I. 
Fischer’s 
(compensated 
dollar). 
 
He met with Keynes.  
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guaranteed by the European 
powers. 
 
The banknotes were issued 
against (i) advance payment 
by the Soviet Union which 
were to be controlled by the 
foreigners and (ii) against 
export guarantees. The 
banknotes were to gradually 
replace the Soviet roubles 
(sovznaks).  
 
Project of the Russian banks 
in Paris (prepared for the 
conference in Genoa 1922) 
 
Issuing shareholding bank 
with foreign participation in 
the capital, but with Russian 
majority. Gold backed, but not 
convertible into gold 
banknotes (inspired by 
Austro-Hungarian Bank). 
 
 
The new currency should 
be gold-backed, and silver 
coins should be issued as 
well.  
because of the 
continuing deficit.  
 
1 chervonets = 10 gold roubles 
 
Denominations (high value) 
banknotes 10, 25, 50, 100. 
 
Convertibility is to be postponed, 
promised, for 2 years. 
 
Gosbank may extend loans in the 
new banknotes 50% backed by 
foreign currency reserves; taxes 
are also payable in banknotes. 
 
The chervonets is backed 25% by 
precious and durable metals and 
gold foreign currencies and 75% 
by easy to place promissory notes 
(bills of exchange) and short-term 
obligations   
Thus, there were 3 operations 
against which chervontsi could be 
issued (Forex reserves, 6-month 
loans, and bills of exchange). 
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V  
NEP and dual currency circulation (November 1922 to May 1924) 
 
Thus, as already mentioned, in late November 1922, Gosbank started issuing chervonets, 
25% backed by precious metals and stable foreign currency (backed by gold) and 75% 
payable bills of exchange, short-term commodity loans. An Issue Department was set within 
the bank’s structure to monitor the coverage. There was also a free issue balance, a surplus 
reserve above the issued amount of chervonets (see balance sheet on table 12) 
 
Table 12 Balance sheet of Issue Department within the Gosbank structure ( NN example)   
 
Asset  Liability  
Cover funds 500  Chervonets banknotes 200  
Free balance from the right to issue notes 300  
 
 
Picture 3 One gold cherconetz 
 
 
 
 
In fact, there was no convertibility and its beginning was not clear (2 years later), it was just 
promised to start in a later date. In other words, stabilisation was not based on convertibility, 
but on quantitative limitation of the issue and the active intervention of the state on the 
foreign exchange market. The purpose was for the chervonets to push gold and foreign 
currency, i.e., to keep the seigniorage from flying abroad. 
 
A note should be made that the chervonets were not received well by the population 
(Yurovsky, 2008 [1917 - 1927], 311-314). The authorities had to introduce them by force, 
similar to the reluctant attitude to gold roubles in Witte’s reform. This exactly was one of the 
arguments which was why a number of Russian economists asserted that the Russian people 
preferred ideal and power-bestowing money rather than tangible money in precious metals 
(Pososhkov, 1724; Sharapov, 1895, Nechvolodov, 2015 [1906]). Mainly the argumentation 
was based on philosophical and cultural grounds (so called Slavophil tradition), but also on 
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the long periods of Russian monetary history based on paper and unbacked currency (roughly 
from 1768 to 1897) 
 
The period was characterised by a number of interesting developments where the spheres of 
the two media of exchange (sovznak and chervonets) either shrank or expanded alone or 
together, initially in a complementary relation and finally becoming rivals, competitive 
currencies. The interaction between complementarity and rivalry, albeit purposefully 
managed, were largely conditional on spontaneous market developments. The figure 4 
presents a dynamic of the dual circulation, form complementarity to competition.  
 
Figure 4 Dual currency circulation (sovsznak and chervonetz), from complementarity to 
competition  
 
 
 
 
 
Complementarity       Complementarity/Rivalry                Rivalry 
 
 
 
V1 Phase of complementarity or “peaceful co-existence and mutual help” (November 
1922 to May 1923) 
 
The chervontsi were a high value currency, denominations of 10 rouble (wages were in the 
order of 1 rouble). They were money of the town. The sovznaks were small value money. 
They were money of the village, of the peasants. The exchange rate between the two was not 
fixed, but floating and announced daily. This way, the state tried to manage the two spheres 
and urge them to support each other, and not to compete. The two media of exchange did not 
fight – they were in a “peaceful co-existence”, or at least that was the Soviet authorities’ aim 
(confirmed at the XII Congress in March 1923). By means of exchange rate interventions, 
they tried to stabilise at one moment the sovznak, at another the chervonets.   
 
After Yurii Goland: 
 
“Sokolnikov declares that if the spheres of activities of the chervonets and the sovznak 
are properly distributed, it is possible that the two co-exist peacefully. He also 
recognizes that if no such division exists, the sovznak would fail. “If the banknote 
enters the retail turnover, if it goes beyond lending to industry and becomes a medium 
of exchange in the retail turnover area, it would kill the sovznak and would itself 
become a sovznak, i.е., a medium of issue of the treasury”. These words explain why 
Narcomfin was against introducing the chervonets.” (Goland, 2006, 459) 
 
 
According to L. Yurovskii, the aim was:  
 
“To use the sovznak as the basis on which to breed and grow the chervonets, and keep 
the sovznak until it’s needed  depending on the condition of the state budget, and as 
far as it could exist more or less, so that the whole monetary system could be 
reformed” (Yurovskii, 319) 
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As far as lending was concerned, the idea was Gosbank would lend short-term loans in 
chervontsi to the light industry, and loans in sovznaks to the heavy industry.  
 
The Soviet literature referred to the chervonets as “a stable currency” and to the sovznak as 
“a declining currency (padaiuchaia valuta)”, that is, there were two media of exchange and 
payment. However, there was a growing demand for the chervonets and an agio occurred, a 
departure from the officially announced exchange rate. 
 
In 1923, the chervonets became unit of account (replaced the gold pre-revolutionary rouble). 
The chervonets quickly asserted itself as the medium of saving and hoarding. It was now in 
demand on international exchange markets and even a song appeared (see Nenovsky, 2006):  
 
“The Brit, the Frenchman, the Pole, the Japanese 
“Are completely stunned,  
“That a chervonets of the proletarian country became already firm 
“Foreign bankers began even to assure that they have to recognize  
“A Pure Golden Russia” Gleiser (1993, [1978])14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chervonets was increasingly in demand because the private craftsmen (shopkeepers, 
farmers). The so-called nepmen profited from it by using it to pay the state enterprises and 
for paying their loan debts in chervonets. On the other hand, the endeavour to strengthen the 
budget and reduce the budget deficit limited the sovznak issue which led to increasing their 
demand. The demand for chervontsi was higher than the demand for sovznaks. There were 
some speculative attacks, attempts against the chertvonets, such as the one organised by W. 
Churchill through the banks in Berlin (to cite…).  
                                                 
14 In Russian this symbolic rhyme sound:  
„Britt, frantsuz, poliak, iaponetz, 
Ochelomlenii vpolne, 
Chto okrep uje chervonez 
V proletarskoi storone. 
Zagranichnie bankirii 
Uje stali uveriat’ 
Chto Chervonnoi im Rossii  
Nevozmojno ne priznat’”, Gleiser (1993, [1978]). 
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In order the prevent the seigniorage from being lost completely and the sovznaks from 
disappearing, G. Sokolnikov (Narcomfin head) decided to issue a new medium of exchange, 
which comprised 3-month 6% lottery bonds redeemable in gold roubles. They were in 
denominations of 500, 1000, and 5000 roubles.  Sokolnikov’s aim was two types of currency 
– bank and fiscal having different logic of coverage and issue (table 13 ).  
 
Table 13 Balance sheet of the issuing institutions according to Sokolnikov (NN 
interpretation) 
 
Bank currency 
Asset Liability  
Gold coverage (gold and foreign currency 
covered by gold) 
Bank money (high value money) 
Commercial loan  
Government bonds 
 
Fiscal currency  
Asset  Liability  
Taxes (in anticipation) Fiscal money (small value money, small 
change) 
 
Narcomfin waged institutional fight with Gosbank and refused to agree to an issue of small 
denomination chervonets banknotes (1/2 chervonets) for fear of losing the seigniorage. On 7 
July 1923, VTsIK (All-Russian Central Executive Committee) took a decision to limit the 
issue of sovznaks in real terms (in gold roubles) and reduce the state expenses (so to preserve 
the sovznak). Although the sovznak depreciated quickly and it became clear that it could not 
be saved, Sokolnikov made a new and last proposal for a new, fourth type of medium of 
exchange to be issued – called “fiscal guaranteed rouble” (July 1923). 
 
This time the price scissors issue aggravated (elaborated in details by L. Trotsky) which was 
reflected in higher industrial prices and falling agrarian prices (in a ratio 3:1) (see chart 4). 
The village more and more boycotting supplies from the town.  
 
Picture 4 The Price scissors 
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Further opening of the price scissors was observed because industrial deals were made in the 
chervonets, while the village – in the falling sovznak. This led to even higher transfer of 
resources from the village to the town. In fact, along with taxes, the scissors were the key 
tool of draining resources from the village (this was theoretically elaborated as “Primitive 
accumulation of socialism” in Initial Accumulation of Socialism by Е. Preobrajenski, Y. 
Larin, etc.) (Preobrajensky, 1970 [1922], 1966 [1926], day, 1975). The depreciating currency 
brought a loss to workers as well since their pays were in sovznaks.  
 
The summer of 1923 saw different new types of exchange bonds. For instance the pharmacy 
“K. Marx” in Kiev issued bonds (1,3, 5, and 10 roubles), similar bonds were issued by a 
canteen in Tula. Transport certificates were issued as well (of 1, 3, 5, 10 k, 20 k, 50 k), 1 
chervonets being equal to 2 transport certificates. At a whole in this period (late 1923), unit 
of account was chervonets (defined in gold roubles), medium of exchange and payment were 
chervonets (banknote), lottery bonds (fiscal money), sovznak (fiscal money), and transport 
certificates (fiscal money). The medium of saving were performed by chervonets, foreign 
currency and gold.  
 
Towards the end of the period, a transition was made to a competition phase. The scope of 
sovznak was reduced, while that of chervonets increased. The velocity of chervonets was 
similar to that of the pre-war gold rouble, while that of the sovznak increased 4-fold in 4 
months. In August 1923, it became absolutely clear that the sovznak would collapse.  
 
V 2 Competition phase, “the sovznak agony”, (May 1923 – May 1924) 
 
The Soviet authorities took a course of complete elimination of the sovznak and a currency 
reform. This was conceded by intended higher issue of sovznaks. The aim was also to 
introduce the chervonets in the village although Sokolnikov proposed once again a new type 
of fiscal money, similar to transport certificates, and fixed to the chervonets. As usual, 
Sokolnikov strived to keep the issue from being taken completely by Gosbank and resisted 
the small chervonets denomination proposed by the governor A.  Scheimann. 
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During October 1923 saw the sovznak increase by 4.4% daily or 131.7% in total. That was 
actually inflation and opened the price scissors even further. Part of the private sector liked 
the currency failing as this also depreciated their debts (this was sustained by the “left 
opposition”, Trotsky for instance). At that time, the budget sphere was stabilised. In 
1922/1923, the losses incurred by state enterprises fell and for the first time some profit was 
registered. The government sector improved its efficiency. The chervonets gained reputation 
and became obligatory in contracts. The current account became positive (monopoly of 
foreign trade was kept), and a silver coin was issued. 
 
Тable 14 Dynamics of the monetary supply January 1923 – October 1924  
 
   Amount of 
Chervontsi 
transferred to the 
bank by the bank 
Issue Department 
(in thousands) 
 
 
Precious metals 
and stable foreign 
currency covering 
the issue of 
chervontsi. 
Percent 
Amount of 
treasury issues 
in circulation 
"Sovsnaks" in 
mlns of Rubles 
Percentage of 
chetvontsi in 
circulation to 
the total 
amount 
Bank's possession 
of gold and foreign 
currency in Russia 
and abroad (in 
thousands of 
chervontsi) 
1 1923 1,118 97,7 1,994 3 3,148 
2  1,93 78,9 2,629 6,3 4,193 
3  3 66,2 3,236 10,6 5,132 
4  4,5 61,9 4,482 14,8 6,486 
5  6 63,8 6,076 22 7,384 
6  8 53,6 7,051 27,7 7,558 
7  9,6 55,3 9,032 37 9,154 
8  13,5 50,1 12,4 50 11,573 
9  18,4 51,4 15,136 66,5 13,664 
10  23,5 50,9 22,702 79 15,853 
11  25,45 50,2 53,593 74,4 16,569 
12  26,766 50,4 98,839 75,4 18,556 
1 1924 28 51,2 178,51 78,3 21,353 
2  30,3 50,7 333,018 83,7 24,655 
3  32,8 51 866,504 82,2 27,128 
4  33,8 51,3 768,101 75,1 30,113 
5  35,2 53,4 740,236 67,6 31,086 
6  36,7 53,3 - 60,5 31,869 
7  38,75 51,9 - 60,9 30,346 
8  41,75 50,1 - 57,6 31,355 
9  46,156 46,8 - 56,9 31,314 
10  51,887 44 - 55,7 30,498 
11  - - - - 32,649 
Source: Katzenellenbaum (1925), p. 104, p. 176.  
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Тable  15 The exchange rate of the chervonets at the Moscow Exchange at the beginning of 
every month and Purchasing Power of the Chervonets 
 
  Exchange rate 
in Soviet 
(1923 issue) 
roubles 
Exchange rate 
in UK Pounds 
(parity - 
1.057) 
Exchange 
rate in US 
Dollars 
(parity - 
5.14) 
Purchasing Power of 
the Chervonets in 
revised wholesale 
index prices of the 
Gosplan 
Purchasing Power of the 
Chervonets in detail 
prices index of the Inst. 
Of "Econ. Conjuncture" 
12 1922 117 1,17 5,087 - - 
1 1923 175 1,219 5,426 10,4 6,99 
2  209 1,259 5,186 9,62 6,8 
3  239,5 1,128 5,206 8,63 6,29 
4  302 1,168 5,206 8,7 6,45 
5  457 1,033 4,408 9,18 6,71 
6  570 0,856 3,851 7,92 5,59 
7  760 1,02 4,662 6,88 4,87 
8  1120 1,037 4,765 6,32 4,41 
9  2000 1,047 4,591 6,36 4,79 
10  4000 1,066 4,878 6,39 5,24 
11  7000 1,093 4,827 6,7 4,48 
12  13700 1,055 4,594 6,36 4,81 
1 1924 30000 1,064 4,545 5,92 4,18 
2  82000 1,085 4,608 5,36 3,89 
3  300000 1,103 4,739 5,18 3,88 
4  500000 1,196 5,141 5,53 3,97 
5  - 1,174 5,141 5,71 4,39 
6  - 1,193 5,145 6,03 4,46 
7  - 1,189 5,141 5,91 4,52 
8  - 1,169 5,141 5,7 4,26 
9  - 1,145 5,141 5,8 4,24 
10  - 1,152 5,141 6,09 4,55 
Source: Katzenellenbaum (1925), p. 108, р. 111 
 
The reform was finally completed on 5 of February 1924. Narcomfin took a decision to issue 
treasury notes (fiscal paper money) of denominations 1, 3, and 5 gold roubles. They were not 
directly linked to either the chervonets or the sovznak, and their volume was fixed at 
maximum at 50% of the chervontsi volume. The purpose behind the new fiscal money was 
to replace the depreciating sovznak.  
 
On 14 of February 1924, the issue of sovznak was stopped and from 7/03/1924 to 10/05/1924 
sovznaks were bought outright at the exchange rate of 1 gold rouble = 50 000 sovznak of 
1923 = 50 billion sovznak rouble of 1922. In total depreciation of the paper rouble until the 
reform was 50 000 000 000. Silver coins were issued in circulation, also by Narcomfin.  
 
The reform was completed, currency circulation was reduced and based on gold. Or, in the 
words of Soviet experts the result was “a system of paper currency circulation with gold 
parity” (sistema bumajno-denejnogo obrachenia s zolotim paritetom). At the end of the 
reforms, after the reform 1924, the unit of account was chervonets (defined in gold roubles), 
the medium of exchange and payment were also chervonets (gold backed banknotes), state 
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paper currency (fiscal currency backed by gold), silver coins (full-bodied money issued by 
the Treasury). The medium of hoarding, saving were chervonets, foreign currencies and gold.  
 
 
VI  
Post-NEP and general reflexions on the early soviet monetary experiences  
 
After Lenin’s death, the attacks against the NEP became stronger and the problems in the 
economy aggravated. The chervonets coverage began melting and on 9 July 1926 their export 
was banned. In 1927, the disproportions intensified and that is believed to be the NEP’s last 
year of existence. G. Sokolnikov was against mixing a long- and a short-term loan when 
issuing chervontsi into circulation. That was also the position of the other prominent 
specialist L. Yurovskii (the debate was with Gosplan in the face of S. Strumilin). The choice 
however had already been made - Stalin took the path of five-year plans and collectivisation. 
For example, table 15 shows that already in 1926-1927 the part of private and cooperative 
sectors in the gross industrial output declined.  
 
Table 15 
Gross Industrial Output According to the Type of Ownership  
(in %, at Pre-war Prices) 
 
Period  
 
State  Cooperative Private and  
Concessionary 
1923-24 70.3 5 24.7 
1924-25 72.2 9.1 18.7 
1925-26 74.7 9.0 16.3 
1926-27 77.1 8.8 14.1 
Source: Bandera (1963), 268 (data are from: Segal, L., B. Tal (1929), Economic policy 
of soviets’ government, Moscow and Leningrad, 165) 
 
 
As a whole, the currency stabilisation was a success even for the fact that gold reserves were 
scarce, merely 8.7% of the gold reserves until the war and 13% of the gold reserves during 
Witte’s stabilisation of 1895/1898. No external loan was taken and the international relations 
were hostile to the Bolsheviks. These are for example the main point of success stressed by 
the witness and distinguished monetary specialist of this period Z. Atlas (1969). Yurii 
Goland, probably the most informed and original modern scholar on NEP, highly prised the 
NEP economic model and particularly the monetary part of the reform (). According to him, 
this was unique missed possibility to develop a different from of socialism economy ().  
 
 
 
- To develop theoretical interpretations of this experience 
- Articulation of different functions, mainly accounting and exchange, payments, also 
big and small denominations   
- How this articulation was theoretically and practically challenged by different 
projects (abolishing monetary accounting, monetary accounting without mean of 
exchange and payment, later monetary regime with two complementary and later 
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competitive means of exchange and payments, finally stabilisation on monetary unity 
of functions (based on gold))  
- What are the tracks for explaining this evolution of monetary projects and policies 
(conventional monetary approach (currency substitution, seigniorage maximization 
via two currencies); Political Economy/International Political Economy approach 
(Monetary regimes changes as expression of group interest/creditors and 
debtors/external and internal/monetary and political/power order…); Institutional, 
sociological, anthropological approach (Institutional complementarity and 
Institutional competition/Pereira and Théret approach to monetary duality/Cuba). 
Role of Interests and Ideas)/ Blanc, Desmedt, Baubeau from the seminar etc 
 
 
 
Annexes  
 
Table  16Work unattendance rate in 1920 for theailway industry 
 
1920  % of absentees from work 
for various reasons (total) 
% of absentees from work for 
unknown or unacceptable reasons 
(progul) 
January 29.8 6.3 
February 29.8 5.1 
March 28.2 5.3 
April 28.8 5.2 
May  26.5 4.4 
June 23.8 4.3 
July 24.8 4.5 
August 25.8 5.3 
September 25.7 4.6 
October 25.3 4.8 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 766 
 
Table 17 Work desertion and unattendance in Ukraine for the first half of 1921  
Factories Number of workers beginning 
of July 
% of absentees from work 
  February March April 
Petrovski   547 17 17 20 
Yuzovski    357 30 - - 
Makeevski 4 462 24 32 33 
Don-Yurevski 1 921 21 34 31 
Luganski 3 565 28 43 43 
Harkovski 4 596 31 25 32 
Kramatorski 2 028 29 30 31 
Druvkovski 1 545 28 33 31 
Taganrogski  4 675 23 21 31 
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Debalcevski    721 38 45 43 
Ekaterinoslavski А 
B 
7 284 
1 364 
45 
21 
52 
24 
53 
24 
Mariupolski 2 466 40 45 54 
Konstantinovski      217 20 19 - 
Kerchenski     464 - - - 
Suvinski 1 891 - - - 
Nikolaevski 3 218 - - - 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 1427 
 
 
 
 
Table  18 Overtime working hours in Moscow 1919 – 1920   
 
 % overtime work Overtime working 
hours, realized by 
a worker in a 
month   
Daily overtime 
working hours 
October 1919 15.8 62.8 2.9 
November 1919 18.3 62.2 3.9 
December 1919 12.7 53.9 2.5 
January 1920 25 67.3 3.7 
February 1920 14.2 37.8 2 
March 1920 17.9 46.8 2.3 
Аpril 1920 14.4 37.9 2 
Мay 1920 15.3 68.8 3.4 
June 1920 17.9 33.2 1.5 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 752 
 
 
Table 11 
Increase of the sovznaks money supply and of prices in sovznaks 
(Based on the preceding month …) 
 
Месец  1921  
 
1922 1923 1924 
 ∆m ∆p ∆m ∆p ∆m ∆p ∆m ∆p 
January 11.1 28 69.8 89 31.8 30 98.6 199 
February  14.6 27 63.0 112 23.1 12 80.6 280 
March 13.3 29 67.3 119 38.5 26   
April 13.7 20 59.5 65 35.6 39   
May 10.7 45 65.0 22 16.0 22   
June 10.6 30 49.7 14 28.1 52   
July 19.6 -2 48.4 -4 37.9 66   
August 22.0 -5 46.6 7 35.3 75   
September 29.0 7 22.3 23 76.5 97   
October 43.1 16 28.7 58 131.7 67   
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November 51.9 44 35.0 42 67.8 110   
December 78.1 108 34.8 29 95.1 136   
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Annex Tabl1 9  
Dynamics of the main variables in Russia during the crises, observed in the period 1905 – 1997   
In %, % change minimum (% change maximum) 
 
 National 
product 
Agrarian Economy  Industry Transport Investment in fixed capital 
  total Plant-growing Farming Total Consumption 
goods 
Cargo-
carrying 
Passengers’  
1905-
1906 
-10 (-15) -15 (-20) -20 (-25) -5 (-10) -5 (-
10) 
- -5 (-10) 0 (-5) -20 (-30) 
1916-
1917 
-20 (-25) -10 (-15) -20 (-25) 0 (-5) -25 (-
30) 
-30 (-35) -20 (-25) -10 (-15) - 
1918-
1921 
-45 (-50) -30 (-35) -35 (-40) -25 (-30) -70 (-
75) 
-50 (-55) -75 (-80) -50 (-55) -75 (-85) 
1932-
1933 
-5 (-10 ) -30 (-35) -20 (-25) -50 (-55) +10 
(+5) 
-5 (-10) 0 (-5) -10 (-15) -10 (-20) 
1940-
1946 
-30 (-35) -50 (-55) -55 (-60) -45 (50) -30 (-
35) 
-45 (-50) -35 (-40) -45 (-50) -40 (-50) 
1990-
1991 
-10 (-15) -5 (-10) -5 (-10) -5 (-10) -5 (-
10) 
-5 (-10) -10 (-15) -10 (-15) -10 (-20) 
1992-
1997 
-40 (-45) -30 (-35) -20 (25) -40 (-45) -50 (-
55) 
-55 (-60) -45 (-50) -35 (-40) -65 (-75) 
Source: Poletaev (2001), p. 222 
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Graph 3. Annual growth of the monetary supply, prices and seigniorage (calculated by 
Preobrazhensky), 1914 – 1922, logarithmic scale 
  
 
 
Graph 2. Currency and price growth (1914 – 1924 г.) – normalized scale 
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